Indonesia’s 2019 presidential election was the latest testament to the popularity of Joko Widodo and his economy-focused domestic agenda. With a stronger popular mandate and a team of rivals standing united behind him, President Jokowi is now in a better position than ?veyears ago to push his reform and revival plans focusing on infrastructure upgrading, human capital development, poverty reduction, and deregulation. Jokowi’s re-election also augurs well for China-Indonesia relations in general and bilateral BRI cooperation in particular, as he will continue to welcome more foreign investment in mega-projects to bring about an infrastructural facelift for Indonesia. A pragmatic Jokowi will not allow long-running thorny issues like territorial disputes, anti-Chinese discrimination, and xenophobia to stand in the way of addressing more immediate domestic priorities, such as maintaining high growth rates, pushing for pro-business regulatory reforms, and promoting higher levels of industrialization. The three years from 2020 to 2022 will be the most crucial period for vigorously advancing BRI cooperation between Beijing and Jakarta because in the lead-up to the 2024 general election, President Jokowi will increasingly ?nd himself a “lame duck” president as factions in his governing coalition begin to splinter to jostle for advantageous positions. He will also be more likely to face growing resistance, backlash, and scrutiny with regard to some of his China-related policies.
